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TORT REFORM UNDER CONSTITUTIONAL FIRE 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Nearly fifty years ago, tort reform was born and states started cap-
ping damages for victims of medical malpractice.  In response, injured 
plaintiffs began challenging noneconomic damage caps on various con-
stitutional grounds—particularly equal protection.  Although equal pro-
tection challenges involve varying state statutes and differing factual 
circumstances, there are common questions woven throughout.  Does a 
law that treats negligently injured persons differently from those who are 
less injured by the same negligent conduct deny the first group equal 
protection of the laws?  If so, does a rational basis exist for such differen-
tial treatment?  
While some courts have struck down laws limiting damages as un-
constitutional, the majority of courts have rejected these challenges.1  
Plaintiffs, nonetheless, continue to raise constitutional attacks against 
laws limiting noneconomic recovery.2  Consequently, the battle over tort 
reform in medical malpractice litigation—particularly concerning caps 
on noneconomic damages—remains fierce.  This Article summarizes the 
pending constitutional challenges against these caps in various states, 
highlights the recent success of plaintiffs in challenging these statutes, 
and advocates that these decisions should serve as red flags for state leg-
islatures to consider restructuring their medical malpractice noneconomic 
damage caps. 
II. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES 
Tort reforms designed to limit damages in medical malpractice cas-
es are currently under constitutional fire in various states across the na-
tion.3  Since the medical malpractice tort reform movement began, caps 
on noneconomic damages have been attacked on various constitutional 
grounds, including equal protection, the right to a jury trial, separation of 
  
 * Articles Editor for the Denver Law Review and 2019 J.D. Candidate at the University of 
Denver Sturm College of Law.  The views expressed in this Article are solely of the author, not of 
his employer or academic affiliation. 
1 Eric S. Goodheart, Two Tiers of Plaintiffs: How North Carolina's Tort Reform Efforts Discriminate 
Against Low-Income Plaintiffs, 96 N.C. L. REV. 512, 540 (2018). 
 2. See infra section II. 
 3. Y. Peter Kang, Four Tort Reform Challenges to Watch, LAW360 (Jan. 29, 2018), 
https://www.law360.com/articles/1002005/4-tort-reform-challenges-to-watch. 
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powers, and due process.4  Generally, courts have rejected these chal-
lenges and upheld the laws as constitutional.5   
Although not bound by the United States Supreme Court’s three-tier 
equal protection standard—strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, and 
rational basis—state courts generally have employed rational basis re-
view to uphold noneconomic damage caps under their respective state 
constitutions.6  Florida, Alabama, and New Hampshire are the only states 
where noneconomic damage caps have not survived equal protection 
challenges.7  In Carson v. Maurer,8 the Supreme Court of New Hamp-
shire found rational basis review inappropriate because of the important 
rights involved with medical malpractice damages.9  Consequently, the 
court invalidated the noneconomic damages cap under a version of in-
termediate scrutiny—requiring that the “challenged classifications are 
reasonable and have a fair and substantial relation to the object of the 
legislation.”10 
Plaintiffs in North Dakota and Wisconsin have, however, recently 
enjoyed success at the trial court and lower appellate court levels by as-
serting that the caps violate equal protection.11  Both the North Dakota 
trial court and Wisconsin Court of Appeals invalided noneconomic dam-
age caps under rational basis review after determining that the caps were 
not rationally related to achieving the legislatures’ stated goals of 
healthcare reform.12  Colorado’s cap on noneconomic damages has also 
been challenged as unconstitutional under the state constitution’s equal 
  
 4. Goodheart, supra note 1, at 540. 
 5. See Constitutional Challenges to State Caps on Non-economic Damages, AM. MED. 
ASS’N, https://www.ama-assn.org/sites/default/files/media-browser/public/arc-public/arc-
constitutional-challenges_1.pdf (listing states’ determinations of the constitutionality of noneconom-
ic damages caps). 
 6. Carly N. Kelly & Michelle M. Mello, Are Medical Malpractice Damages Caps Constitu-
tional? An Overview of State Litigation, 33 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 515, 522 (2005) ("Under rationality 
review, a state law will be upheld as long as the classification has a rational relationship to a legiti-
mate government objective."). 
 7. Goodheart, supra note 1, at 539; see also North Broward Hosp. Dist. v. Kalitan, 219 So.3d 
49, 50 (Fla. 2017); Moore v. Mobile Infirmary Ass'n, 592 So.2d 156, 170 (Ala. 1991); Brannigan v. 
Usitalo, 587 A.2d 1232, 1233 (N.H. 1991).  The Wisconsin Supreme Court struck down a noneco-
nomic damages cap for violating the state constitution’s equal protection clause.  Ferdon v. Wis. 
Patients Comp. Fund, 701 N.W.2d 440, 455 (Wis. 2005).  In response to Ferdon, the state legislature 
amended the statutory cap on noneconomic damages to $750,000, which was recently struck down 
by the Court of Appeals of Wisconsin.  See Mayo v. Wisconsin Injured Patients & Families Comp. 
Fund, 901 N.W.2d 782, 794 (2017), review granted, 905 N.W.2d 840; WIS. STAT. § 893.55 (2006).  
 8. 424 A.2d 825, 830 (N.H. 1980). 
 9. Id.  
 10. Id. at 831.  The Supreme Court of New Hampshire later overruled Carson to the extent 
that it employed this version of intermediate scrutiny.  See Cmty. Res. for Justice, Inc. v. City of 
Manchester, 154 N.H. 748, 762 (2007). 
 11. Kang, supra note 3. 
 12. Id. On June 27, 2018, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin reversed the appellate court and 
held that the noneconomic damages cap is constitutional. Mayo v. Wisconsin Injured Patients & 
Families Comp. Fund, No. 2014AP2812, 2018 WL 3132486, at *1 (Wis. June 27, 2018). 
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protection clause.13  This Part summarizes the recent constitutional chal-
lenges plaintiffs have raised against statutory limitations on noneconomic 
recovery in medical malpractice litigation. 
A. North Dakota 
In Condon v. St. Alexius Medical Center,14 a trial judge recently 
held that North Dakota Century Code Section 32-42-0215—a statute cap-
ping noneconomic damages at $500,000 in medical malpractice cases—
is unconstitutional.16  As a result of a negligently performed surgery, 
Condon, a thirty-five year old woman, suffered a disabling stroke.17  The 
jury determined that the physician-defendant in the case negligently cut 
the main artery supplying blood to Condon’s brain during a lymph node 
biopsy.18  Consequently, the severance of the artery caused a stroke and 
paralysis, which left Condon with limited use of her upper and lower left 
extremities.19  In addition, medical experts opined that the effects of 
Condon’s brain injury would likely worsen over time.20 
The jury awarded Condon $3.5 million in damages—$2 million for 
economic loss and $1.5 million for noneconomic loss, which included 
emotional distress and pain and suffering.21  Subsequently, the defend-
ants, St. Alexius Medical Center and Dr. Michael Booth, moved to re-
duce the verdict pursuant to North Dakota’s statutory cap on noneconom-
ic damages, which limits recovery of such damages to $500,000.22  In 
response, Condon argued that the law violated the state constitution’s 
equal protection clause because the cap discriminated against plaintiffs 
who cannot establish large economic loss—particularly children and 
stay-at-home parents.23  Moreover, Condon’s attorney explained that the 
noneconomic damages cap gave the most negligent physicians the great-
  
 13. See Smith v. Surgery Center at Lone Tree, 2017 WL 3610797 (Colo. Dist. Ct. May 26, 
2017); see also COLO. CONST. art. II, § 25. 
 14. 08-2014-CV-1904 (Jan. 9, 2018). 
 15. N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-42-02 (“With respect to a health care malpractice action or claim, 
the total amount of compensation that may be awarded to a claimant or members of the claimant's 
family for noneconomic damage resulting from an injury alleged under the action or claim may not 
exceed five hundred thousand dollars, regardless of the number of health care providers and other 
defendants against whom the action or claim is brought or the number of actions or claims brought 
with respect to the injury. With respect to actions heard by a jury, the jury may not be informed of 
the limitation contained in this section. If necessary, the court shall reduce the damages awarded by a 
jury to comply with the limitation in this section.”). 
 16. Kang, supra note 3. 
 17. North Dakota Malpractice Damages Law Ruled Unconstitutional, AP NEWS (Jan. 10 
2018), https://apnews.com/b678e55df5bf4af4accfce8c93fd3437. 
 18. Amy Dalrymple, N.D. Law Limiting Damages in Malpractice Cases Ruled Unconstitu-
tional, BISMARCK TRIBUNE (Jan. 9, 2018), http://bismarcktribune.com/news/local/bismarck/n-d-law-
limiting-damages-in-malpractice-cases-ruled-unconstitutional/article_d9be1b4a-f753-56c6-8775-
7f8d1c317c9c.html. 
 19. Id. 
 20. See id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Kang, supra note 3. 
 23. North Dakota Malpractice Damages Law Ruled Unconstitutional, supra note 17. 
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est reprieve: “The greater the harm caused by the negligent doctor, the 
greater the discount.”24 
South Central Judicial District Judge Cynthia Feland denied the de-
fendants’ motion.25  In her 29-page ruling, Judge Feland explained that 
the statutory cap failed rational basis review: 
The noneconomic damage cap in Section 32-42-02 does not pass the 
rational basis test because in the context of persons catastrophically 
injured by medical negligence, it is unreasonable and arbitrary to lim-
it their recovery in a speculative experiment where there is no evi-
dence of an availability or cost crisis problem for medical malprac-
tice insurance in North Dakota.26  
Judge Feland found that the legislative history behind the cap re-
vealed that the law’s enactment was based on unsupported assumptions 
and speculation.27  Further, the record failed to explain how a $500,000 
cap on noneconomic damages would accomplish the legislature’s stated 
purpose of increasing access to healthcare, improving the quality of care, 
and controlling medical malpractice insurance premium prices.28  Ac-
cordingly, Judge Feland held that the cap unreasonably and arbitrarily 
limits damages for the most catastrophically injured patients of medical 
malpractice and, thus, denies this group equal protection of the laws.29 
B. Wisconsin 
In November 2017, the Wisconsin Supreme Court announced that it 
would determine the constitutionality of the state’s cap on noneconomic 
damages following the decision by a lower appellate court to strike down 
the cap on equal protection grounds.30  In Mayo v. Wisconsin Injured 
Patients and Families Company Fund,31 Ascaris Mayo visited the emer-
gency room at Columbia St. Mary’s Hospital in Milwaukee, presenting 
high fever and abdominal pain.32  The physician’s assistant, Donald Gib-
son, included infection in his differential diagnosis, and at trial he admit-
ted Mayo’s symptoms satisfied the criteria for Systematic Inflammatory 
Response Syndrome.33  Neither Gibson nor the attending physician, Dr. 
Wyatt Jaffe, informed Mayo about the diagnosis.34  Further, neither med-
ical professional informed Mayo about treatment for the infection—
  
 24. Dalrymple, supra note 18. 
 25. Kang, supra note 3. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Dalrymple, supra note 18. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Kang, supra note 3. 
 30. Mayo v. Wis. Injured Patients & Families Comp. Fund, 901 N.W.2d 782 (Wis. App. 
2017), review granted, 905 N.W.2d 840. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. at 785. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
2018] TORT REFORM UNDER FIRE 21 
namely antibiotics—and simply told Mayo to follow up with her gyne-
cologist.35  When Mayo’s condition worsened, she visited a different 
emergency room the next day where medical professionals diagnosed her 
with a septic infection.36  The sepsis ultimately caused major organ fail-
ure and resulted in dry gangrene, requiring amputation of all four of 
Mayo’s extremities.37  
At trial, the jury found neither Dr. Jaffe nor Gibson medically neg-
ligent but determined that both professionals failed to provide informed 
consent to Mayo regarding diagnosis and treatment options for her infec-
tion.38  The jury awarded Ascaris Mayo $15,000,000 in noneconomic 
damages and Antonio Mayo $1,500,000 for loss of consortium.39  Fol-
lowing trial, the Wisconsin Injured Patients and Families Compensation 
Fund, one of the defendants, filed a motion seeking to reduce the verdict 
pursuant to Wisconsin’s statutory damages cap,40 which limits noneco-
nomic recovery to $750,000.41  The trial court found the law did not fa-
cially violate the state’s equal protection guarantee but determined the 
cap was unconstitutional as applied to Mayo’s case.42  On appeal, the 
Fund challenged the trial court’s determination as it applied to the May-
os.43  Likewise, the Mayos argued that the cap facially violates the state 
constitution by denying catastrophically injured patients equal protection 
rights.44 
The Court of Appeals of Wisconsin found the state high court’s 
analysis in Ferdon v. Wisconsin Patients Company Fund45—a 2005 deci-
sion where the Wisconsin Supreme Court struck down a $350,000 none-
conomic damages cap as unconstitutional—controlled.46  The court of 
appeals, like the supreme court in Ferdon, found no rational basis be-
tween the noneconomic damage cap and the lawmakers' stated goals of 
keeping insurance costs low, reducing defensive medicine, or preventing 
physicians from migrating to other states.47  Data in the record, the appel-
late court noted, indicated that “the existence or non-existence of a none-
conomic damages cap has no demonstrably consistent effect on physi-
cian retention anywhere.  Data demonstrates that many states with no 
caps on noneconomic damages actually have higher physician retention 
  
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 785–86. 
 37. Id. at 786. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Wis. Stat. § 893.55 (2017). 
 41. Mayo, 901 N.W.2d at 786. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 786–87. 
 45. 701 N.W.2d 440, 455 (Wis. 2005). 
 46. Mayo, 901 N.W.2d at 788–91 (explaining the previous noneconomic damages cap limited 
recovery to $350,000 and the current statute capped damages at $750,000); see also supra note 7. 
 47. Mayo, 901 N.W.2d at 791. 
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rates than Wisconsin.”48  Ultimately, the court agreed with the Mayos 
and declared the cap facially unconstitutional, extending the trial court’s 
decision to all medical malpractice cases.49 
On June 27, 2018, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin reversed, find-
ing the noneconomic damages cap neither facially unconstitutional nor 
unconstitutional as applied to the Mayos.50  The Wisconsin high court 
determined that “rational basis is the proper standard by which to judge 
the constitutionality of Wis. Stat. § 893.55.”51  Accordingly, the court 
overruled Ferdon because it “erroneously invaded the province of the 
legislature and applied an erroneous standard of review”—a form of ra-
tional basis with bite.52  The court explained that the legislature’s policy 
choice was rational because it was concerned about “massive noneco-
nomic damages awards” that are “unpredictable and often based on emo-
tion,” desired a plan for accessible healthcare, and provided a mechanism 
to ensure injured patients were compensated for their injuries.53  Thus, 
the Supreme Court of Wisconsin held that the law satisfied rational basis 
review.54 
C. Colorado 
There is currently a constitutional challenge against Colorado’s 
noneconomic damages cap for medical malpractice cases pending in a 
state trial court.55  In September 2013, Robbin Smith visited the Surgery 
Center at Lone Tree for treatment of pain in her lower back.56  Smith’s 
physician performed a transforaminal epidural steroid injection with a 
particulate steroid, despite the drug’s warning label indicating it should 
not be used for epidural injections.57  Immediately following the injec-
tion, Smith became permanently paralyzed from the waist down.58  After 
being transferred to another medical center, Smith’s MRI showed that 
the paralysis resulted from a spinal cord infarct—i.e., a stroke—that sev-
ered blood flow to her spine.59  Smith never regained function or feeling 
below the waist, has no control of her bladder, and requires constant 
care.60  
  
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 786–87, 794. 
 50. Mayo v. Wis. Injured Patients & Families Comp. Fund, No. 2014AP2812, 2018 WL 
3132486, at *1 (Wis. June 27, 2018). 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. (according to the Wisconsin Supreme Court, Ferdon improperly “threw all of the 
principles of rational basis aside. It created an intermediate level of review that it called rational 
basis with teeth, or meaningful rational basis”) (internal quotations omitted). Id. at *6–7. 
 53. Id. at *11. 
 54. Id. at *11–13. 
 55. See Smith v. Surgery Center at Lone Tree, 2017 WL 3610797 (Colo. Dist. Ct. 2017). 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
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On March 23, 2015, the jury rendered a verdict against Lone Tree, 
finding the medical center negligent both in treating Smith and in failing 
to obtain informed consent about the procedure.61  The jury awarded 
Robbin Smith $4,905,000 in total economic damages and $6,500,000 in 
noneconomic damages, and it awarded Ed Smith $3,500,000 for past and 
future noneconomic damages.62  Colorado’s statutory cap on noneco-
nomic damages in medical malpractice cases,63 however, limits recovery 
of such damages to $300,000.64  Accordingly, the plaintiffs have filed a 
motion to declare the damages cap unconstitutional on several grounds, 
including the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial, the right to access 
to the courts, the prohibition on special legislation, and equal protec-
tion.65 
In their motion, the plaintiffs asserted that the noneconomic damage 
cap violates the U.S. Constitution’s guarantee of the right to a jury trial66 
because the cap disregards the prerogative of the jury in making binding 
factual determinations of damages.67  Additionally, the plaintiffs argued 
that the cap infringes the constitutional right of access to the courts be-
cause it eradicates loss of consortium claims by the spouse of the physi-
cally injured victim when the harm is catastrophic.68  The cap also, the 
plaintiffs noted, violates the special legislation prohibition by restricting 
damages against health care providers in an arbitrary manner that negli-
gent defendants in other types of cases do not enjoy.69  And finally, the 
plaintiffs contended that the cap violates equal protection “by treat-
ing married plaintiffs less favorably than an unmarried plaintiff, by treat-
ing more catastrophically injured plaintiffs less favorably than 
  
 61. Id. 
 62. Id.  This is the second largest award for medical negligence in Colorado history.  Monica 
Mendoza, Paralyzed Woman Wins $14.9 Million Malpractice Verdict, DENVER BUS. J. (Apr. 6, 
2017), https://www.bizjournals.com/denver/news/2017/04/06/colorado-paralyzed-woman-wins-14-
9-million.html. 
 63. COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-64-302 (2018). 
 64. Id. (“The total amount recoverable for all damages for a course of care for all defendants 
in any civil action for damages in tort brought against a health care professional, as defined 
in section 13-64-202, or a health care institution, as defined in section 13-64-202, or as a result of 
binding arbitration, whether past damages, future damages, or a combination of both, shall not 
exceed one million dollars, present value per patient, including any claim for derivative noneconom-
ic loss or injury, of which not more than two hundred fifty thousand dollars, present value per pa-
tient, including any derivative claim, shall be attributable to direct or derivative noneconomic loss or 
injury . . . . Effective July 1, 2003, the damages limitation of two hundred fifty thousand dollars 
described in paragraph (b) of this subsection (1) shall be increased to three hundred thousand dollars, 
which increased amount shall apply to acts or omissions occurring on or after said date. It is the 
intent of the general assembly that the increase reflect an adjustment for inflation to the damages 
limitation.”). 
 65. Smith, 2017 WL 3610797. 
 66. U.S. CONST., amend. VII (“In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall 
exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall 
be otherwise reexamined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the com-
mon law.”). 
 67. Smith, 2017 WL 3610797. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
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more mildly injured plaintiffs, and by treating medical malpractice plain-
tiffs less favorably than other personal-injury plaintiffs.”70 
The Colorado Supreme Court has previously addressed equal pro-
tection and right to civil jury trial challenges against Colorado’s noneco-
nomic damages cap.  In Scholz v. Metro. Pathologists, P.C.,71 the Colo-
rado Supreme Court rejected a challenge against the cap, finding that the 
right to a civil jury trial did not exist under the state constitution.72  The 
court also found the cap constitutional under the equal protection clause 
because the Generally Assembly enacted the pertinent statute “in 1988 in 
response to legislative findings which indicated severe problems con-
cerning health care availability due to the rising costs of malpractice in-
surance premiums in Colorado.”73  In Garhart ex rel. Tinsman v. Colum-
bia/Healthone, L.L.C.,74 the Colorado Supreme Court reaffirmed that the 
state constitution did not provide the right to a jury trial in civil cases.75  
While the court elected not to revisit its equal protection determination in 
Scholz, it rejected an argument that the noneconomic damage cap violat-
ed the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection guarantee.76 
As of July 31, 2018, the trial judge in Smith has not ruled on the 
plaintiffs’ motion to declare the noneconomic damages cap unconstitu-
tional. 
III. STATE LEGISLATURES ON NOTICE 
No matter how the courts ultimately rule in the cases above, the 
constitutional concerns presented by these pending challenges are red 
flags for state legislatures that reform is overdue in the area of noneco-
nomic damage caps.  While rigid caps on noneconomic damages may 
appease the healthcare industry, they appear neither well suited for low-
ering healthcare costs nor accomplishing the goals they were enacted to 
achieve.77  As recognized by Judge Feland and the Wisconsin Court of 
Appeals, these caps also limit the recovery of catastrophically injured 
patients who may not have much in terms of economic loss.  Despite this 
  
 70. Id.  
 71. 851 P.2d 901 (Colo. 1993). 
 72. Id. at 905–06. 
 73. Id. at 907. 
 74. 95 P.3d 571 (Colo. 2004). 
 75. Id. at 580. 
 76. Id. at 583–84. 
 77. See Weiss Ratings: Caps Fail to Contain Malpractice Cost Increases, S. FLA. BUS. J. 
(June 2, 2003), http://www.bizjournals.com/southflorida/stories/2003/06/02/daily3.html?page=all 
(finding that states with damages caps had higher medical malpractice insurance premium increases 
but states without caps maintained stable rates); Bradley A. Bauer, Don't Stop ‘Til the Medical 
Malpractice Victim Gets Enough: Watts v. Lester E. Cox Med. Ctrs., 376 S.W.3d 633 (Mo. 2012), 
and Why Caps on Noneconomic Damages Violate the Right to Trial by Jury in Medical Malpractice 
Case, 38 S. Ill. U.L.J. 491, 492 (2014) (“[S]tudies by the non-partisan U.S. Government Accounta-
bility Office (GAO) indicated that, because of the multiple factors that go into whether medical 
malpractice premiums increase or decrease, there is no direct correlation between a cap on noneco-
nomic damages and lower medical malpractice premium rates.”). 
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decision being reversed, the argument that rigid noneconomic damage 
caps deprive certain patients of equal protection under the laws undoubt-
edly has merit depending on the structure of the statute. 
Considering the continued vitality of noneconomic damage caps in 
most states, it is unlikely—but not impossible—that most state supreme 
courts will not overturn these reforms anytime in the near future.  Re-
gardless, the viability of equal protection challenges against the rigid 
noneconomic damage caps in these states should put the legislatures on 
notice that reform is needed.  This Article is not intended to offer a solu-
tion to the healthcare crisis or explore the options available to state legis-
latures in restructuring damage caps.  Rather, the purpose is to identify 
aspects of medical malpractice reform currently under constitutional fire 
and highlight that the attacks against noneconomic damage caps do have 
merit.  Accordingly, state legislatures should evaluate the reasonableness 
of their caps on noneconomic damages and restructure their statutes to 
ensure both that catastrophically patients are adequately compensated 
and that the relevant healthcare reform goals are accomplished. 
Bryston C. Gallegos*78 
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